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REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE.
Boston, January 31, 1938.
To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court Assembled:
In accordance with section 18 of chapter 486 of the
Acts of 1909, the Finance Commission of the City of
Boston submits its annual report for the year 1937.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION.
There has been one change in the membership of the
Commission since the last annual report was issued.
Under date of April 13 Philip A. Chapman resigned as
a member and on April 14 His Excellency Governor
Charles F. Hurley designated David Lasker as Chair-
man. Mr. Lasker was appointed to fill the unexpired
term of Mr. Chapman, said term expiring August 9.
On August 25 Mr. Lasker was sworn in for a new term
as Chairman, said term to end August 9, 1942.
II. APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES.
The amount appropriated for the Finance Commis-
sion for the year 1937 was $50,000. The expenditures
were as follows:
Pcrinaiicnt om])l()yocs $31,241 00
Priiitiiift- and binding 831 73
Transportation of persons 79 87
Light and power 159 38
Rent 5,103 75
Tek^granis, telephones and messenger service 426 03
Cleaning 72 00
Stenographic, stencils 34 55
Fees 20 00
Photographing and blueprinting .... 1 50
Miscellaneous items and repairs 51 13
Electrical equipment —
Carried forward $38,020 94
4Brought forward . $38,020 94
Furniture and fittings 9 00
Office equipment 85 00
Library equipment 94 00
Office supplies 524 03
Ice .... 49 50
Miscellaneous supplies 14 11
Electrical supplies
Hire of experts, etc., in special investigations 10,825 08
$49,621 66
Amount appropriated $50 000 00
Amount expended 49,621 66
Balance unexpended .... $378 34
III. THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION.
A new administration of City affairs has already been
started upon its four-year course. In his first month
in office, the new mayor has devoted considerable time
to an effort to make the people realize the serious finan-
cial predicament of the City. He has not spared words
in making a dismal picture of the condition of the City
treasury and the slim prospects of improvement for a
long time to come. On the other hand, the outgoing
mayor boasted of achievement of financial improvement
during his four years, and counselled his successor not
to take too seriously the alarm expressed in some
quarters for the future financial safety of the City,
claiming that it is not so badly off as some would have
the people think.
There need be no honest difference of opinion on the
present status of the City's financial situation if one
will but examine the figures. First of all, the City
owes more today than ever before; and secondly, the
maintenance cost of the City is greater today than ever
before. These are the two principal items which
determine the size of the bill the taxpayers must meet.
On the other side of the picture, there are also two
main items. One is the property valuation of the City
5which must bear the major part of the increased debt
and maintenance burden, and the other is the City's
abihty to collect the taxes it levies. Property valua-
tions, already down $380,000,000 since 1930, are still
shrinking and not even the pleas of a distraught mayor
will stop further substantial drop in valuation of down-
town property. If the size of the bill the taxpayers
have to meet is going higher each year, and the property
valuation of the city, over which the bill is spread, is
steadily decreasing it is obvious that the rate of taxation
must go higher.
Then there is the matter of the ability of the City
to collect the taxes it levies.
Before the depression the City for many years col-
lected each year between 85 and 90 per cent of the
current year's assessments. In addition, each year the
City collected several millions of previous year's assess-
ments which when received, were free cash and served
to make up the for 10 to 15 per cent delinquency in the
current assessment.
Since the depression, collections in Boston have fallen
off another 15 per cent. The lowest point reached in
the depression was 70 per cent. In 1936 this was
improved to 74 per cent, but in 1937 it was back again
to 72| per cent approximately. Meanwhile the back
taxes asset has been wiped out. The City has borrowed
up to and beyond the amount of the back taxes that is
collectible.
This inability to collect more than 70-odd per cent of
the current levy is more significant when it is remembered
that the date of assessment has been advanced from
April 1 to January 1 and taxes are payable in June
instead of October as formerly.
Because discussion of this situation will take place
many times before the Legislature this year, it is timely
now to point out these important facts:
1. The total requirements of the City for all
purposes (city, county and debt appropriations,
state warrants and Metropolitan assessments) as
6fixed in the determination of the tax rate, increased
from approximately $77,100,000 in 1933, the last
year of the Curley administration, to $80,700,000
in 1937, the last year of the Mansfield adminis-
tration.
2. The net requirements (the above less revenues
other than from taxes and plus overlay) increased
from approximately $58,500,000 in 1933 to
$61,500,000 in 1937.
3. The valuations, real and personal, as fixed
at the end of the fiscal year (original assessments
less abatements) have decreased from $1,746,703,400
in 1933 to $1,573,980,400 in 1937.
4. Real and personal property valuation, against
which the levy is assessed, has therefore decreased
$172,723,000 in four years.
5. The tax rate has risen from $32.80 per $1,000
supplemented by $7,600,000 of borrowed money
in 1933 to $38.70 supplemented by $5,250,000 of
borrowed money in 1937.
6. The true rate of 1933 was, therefore, approxi-
mately $37.20 as against a true rate of approximately
$42.00 in 1937.
7. The outstanding debt of the City at the
end of 1933 was $149,315,000, made up as follows:—
net debt, $135,815,000; outstanding tax anticipa-
tion notes, $13,500,000. At the end of 1937 the out-
standing debt of the City was $160,416,000, made
up as follows:— net debt, $130,156,000; outstand-
ing tax anticipation notes, $23,000,000; tax title
loans, $7,260,000.
8. This means, therefore, that the present
new mayor has a total of $11,101,000 more debt
to face upon taking office than did his predecessor
when he took office.
9. The amount of the debt outstanding at the
end of 1933 that had been borrowed for distinctly
current expenses (generally regarded as the worst
class of municipal debt) was $7,600,000. Of this
7same class, the amount outstanding at the end of
1937 was approximately $15,877,000.
It does not improve this picture any to record the
fact that at the present time there are abatement cases
pending before the Tax Appeals Board which represent
over $870,000,000 in valuations, or approximately
$30,000,000 in taxes. This means that the owners of a
very substantial part of the total real estate of the City
have already gone to the extent and expense of entering
an appeal from the assessors^ valuations. In many other
cases, abatements are sought, but formal appeal from
assessors' rulings has not yet been taken. When all
these cases are finally adjusted and consequent new and
lower valuations recorded, the total valuation of the
City will be substantially lowered and the rate of taxa-
tion correspondingly increased.
Likewise it makes the picture worse to record the fact
that the many expansions of municipal service that took
place late in the last year of the Mansfield administra-
tion greatly increased the maintenance costs of the City.
These include the operation of the new buildings at the
City Hospital, the increases in number of firemen and
policemen, and the additions to the pay roll by new
appointments, transfers, increases, etc., w^hich w^ere
authorized by the wholesale at the end of 1937.
From perusal of the above figures it is plain to see
that the new mayor has much to worry about, and
that any contrary opinion cannot possibly be based on
accurate statement of the facts.
1. Unfinished City Business.
During the administration which ended January 3,
1938, the Finance Commission investigated and exposed
many instances of extreme waste and extravagance in
the operation of the city departments. At this time
the Commission beheves it is proper to point out that in
a number of these cases the administration expired
without any serious effort by any official agency to
restore to the City treasury any part of the unconscion-
8able profits obtained by contractors and others. Action
has been taken to punish the offenders in only one
instance of the many reported upon in which the fraud
against the city amounted to many tens of thousands of
dollars. Yet in the administration recently terminated
there were more instances of gross fraud revealed than
in any previous similar period since the creation of the
Finance Commission. Cases of major importance re-
ported upon which are still pending are as follows:—
a. The Investigation of Coal Contracts for Welfare
Recipients and for City Departments.
In the summer of 1936, the Finance Commission
held public hearings at which it was disclosed that a
number of coal contractors violated in many respects
the specifications of their written contracts with the
City. As a result, welfare recipients were supplied
with a grade of coal from which they could obtain no
heat, and an inferior grade of fuel was delivered to city
buildings. The Finance Commission recommended a
black list of the contractors involved; recommended
discontinuance of the employment of the particular
chemist who had contracted to check up on the quality
of the coal delivered; urged the adoption of a method of
obtaining a supply of coal similar to the plan worked
out by the Anthracite Institute of America, and in
operation generally outside Boston; and recommended
that the city decline to pay the contractors for the coal
delivered until the courts fixed the amount and ordered
payment.
Despite public denials by the city officials and the
representatives of the accused coal companies of charges
of delinquencies developed at the hearings and despite
also the many times repeated finding of the Mayor that
the Finance Commission was actuated by a poHtical
motive, all of the Commission's recommendations were
adopted. The coal companies involved were black-
listed, a new chemist took over the analysis of city coal,
9and a plan substantially in accordance with the recom-
mendations of the Anthracite Institute of America wa s
worked out and adopted. Bills totaUng approxi-
mately $85,000 for the coal dehvered remain unpaid
at the present time. Suits for recovery have been
entered in court by the accused contractors and have
already proceeded to trial before a master.
In this case, the outgoing administration eventually
made a real effort to obtain justice for the City. It is
cited here, mainly for the purpose of recording, that the
recommendations of the Finance Commission were
subsequently adopted, though their merit was pubhcly
disputed when originally made.
h. The Investigation of the Snow Removal Cost.
In its report to the Legislature in 1937, the Finance
Commission pointed out that no action had been
started at that time by the city administration to punish
those responsible for the gross fraud perpetrated against
the City in the winter of 1935 and 1936 by snow remova 1
contractors. The Finance Commission had exposed
this fraud in a series of public hearings and in a number
of reports to the Mayor and Council.
The determination of the administrative heads to
disregard the findings of the Finance Commission in its
investigation of that fraud continued to the very end
of the administration.
Neither the Mayor nor his Public Works Com-
missioner ever attempted to explain the discrepancy
between the removal cost per inch of $5,456 in 1933
and the removal cost per inch of $24,770 in the winter
of 1935. The United States Weather Bureau recorded
50.5 inches of snowfall in 1933 and only 45.1 inches in
1935.
The expenditure of City funds to an extent approach-
ing $2,000,000 for snow removal in one season of two
real snowfalls, as is revealed by the records, at any
time warrants suspicion. In this case the examination
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and analysis of the records by the Finance Commission
revealed ample evidence of fraudulent billing to the
City and fraudulent collection of money.
All the facts were recorded before the Commission
publicly and later placed before the Mayor. These
facts, pieced together, made out the story of one of
the most serious instances of looting of the City treasury
in the history of the City.
The charges developed by the Finance Commission
remain undisputed except for the expression by one
city official of a feeble ''It can't be so!" Yet when
the first contractor involved in the case to be called
before the Finance Commission appeared without sup-
porting records, he claimed all his books and papers
were stolen from a parked automobile the night before
he was due, by subpoena, to show them to the Com-
mission.
The attitude of the city officials to that suspicious
happening was so complacent that the exact method
then follow^ed of avoiding disclosure of records was
adopted in another case later which has been given
wide publicity. The Finance Commission is satisfied
that it was resorted to because examination of the
books would have revealed what had become of the
profits, and that disclosure of who received parts of
the profits would have constituted a greater scandal.
Unfortunately for the taxpayers, the Finance Com-
mission cannot institute legal proceedings either for
the punishment of offenders or for the recovery of
fraudulent payments. The Commission however placed
the evidence collected in this case before the Mayor
and the District Attorney, either of whom could initiate
court action, and both of whom owed it to the taxpayers
to take action.
c. The White Fund Investigation,
In the spring of 1937, charges were made in the City
Council by two councilors that a firm known as the
Codman Hill Construction Company had been given a
11
monopoly of repair and renovation work on the exten-
sive White Fund properties. These properties are man-
aged by a board of trustees, of which the Mayor is
chairman. The charges further recited that there had
been serious overcharge in the payment for work per-
formed. Unanimously, the City Council asked the
Finance Commission to find the facts.
The story of the investigation as told by a special
counsel, George R. Farnum, through the testimony of
witnesses under oath at public hearings, and later in
written reports, is now^ well established in the recent
history of Boston. It is an amazing recital of negli-
gence, extravagance and graft, and yet was illustrative
of practices of city contractors repeatedly reported upon
by the Finance Commission.
A house builder in the suburbs, previously unknown
in City work, who was the sole owner and operator of a
firm that came into existence for the first time at the
beginning of the Mansfield administration, because of
close business and personal relations with the Mayor
was given practically carte blanche orders to renovate
and repair the extensive real estate holdings of the
George Robert White Fund. His work and the bills
therefor were accepted substantially unchecked by any
Fund representative. Payment to the extent of
$124,419.91 had been made from the White Fund when
the investigation began. Bills for other work for City
departments to the extent of $211,555.85 had also
been paid. Less than 3 per cent of this large total
was for work that was obtained in competition.
When his books and records were subpoenaed he
claimed they were stolen from a parked automobile at
midnight in an outlying section of the City then under
development. He and his accountant were sent to
jail by a judge of the Superior Court, who refused to
believe their story.
In the middle of the presentation of the evidence
gathered by the Commission's counsel, and despite
pubhc proffer of aid by the White Fund trustees in
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unravelling the stor}', the ]\Iayor — chairman of the
board — suddenly appeared at the public hearings of
the Finance Commission in the role of defendant and
as friend and defender of the contractor. Thereafter,
he offered repeated and violent obstruction to the
presentation of the case by the Commission's counsel.
It is unnecessar}^ here to relate in detail the evidence
offered which supported the charges made by the City
Council. On the last day of the hearings which extended
over a five-month period and occupied a total of 41
da^^s in actual public hearing of testimony, the INIa^w
announced that he believed the contractor was honest
in his deahngs with the White Fund and the City,
that the work was properly performed and the pay-
ments made were just, and that therefore he would
take no action against anyone involved in the
investigation.
A majority of the members of the Finance Commis-
sion, sitting in this case solely as judges of the evidence
presented, accepted the conclusions of its special counsel
that the White Fund had been defrauded by the Cod-
man Hill Construction Company: that the ^layor
was primarily responsible for allowing this fraud: that
the other trustees of the White Fund were in a large
measure also to blame because they failed to assume
the responsibility^ that was properh^ theirs and accord-
ingly^ failed to perform the duties expected of them as
trustees of the Fund; and that the subordinate agents
of the trustees were lax in the ordinary^ supervision
and inspection of the work and in the checking of the
bills therefor. The majority of the Commission re-
quested the ]\Iayor and the District Attorney to take
action accordingly.
It is noteworthy that when the ]vIayor went out of
ofhce on January 3, 1938, despite previous public clear-
ance by him of the Codman Hill Construction Com-
pany of all charges of wrongdoing, bills amounting to
813,111.09 presented by the Codman Hill Construc-
tion Company for work allegedly performed for the
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White Fund last spring were still unpaid. Payment
was withheld by order of the Mayor as requested by
the Finance Commission.
Other substantial benefit came from the investiga-
tion. The City Auditor directed and supervised the
installation of the safeguards devised for the protection
of the City in City departmental accounting into all
Trust Fund administration; the White Fund trustees
assumed the responsibility in the management of the
Trust intended by the donor of the White Fund and
by the City Government in the acceptance of the bequest;
and new checks were provided for the ordering and
accounting for city work in all departments as dictated
by the experience of the White Fund management and
the City departments in the transactions under
investigation.
The three cases described above are still unfinished
business of the City of Boston. As already stated, in the
first, sufficient action has been started to protect the
taxpayers' interests. In the snow removal case and in
the White Fund case, there remains much that the City
can and should do, and since it was not done by the
administration which ended on January 3, 1938, it comes
within the province of the new administration to force
action.
2. Other Investigations.
(a) Contract Work.
During the past three years the Finance Commission
has on many occasions brought to public notice the fact
that work costing the City milhons of dollars was
parceled out to a selected Hst of contractors without
competition, and often without definite control of the
prices to be paid, or the extent of the work to be done.
What is now generally known to have been done in the
White Fund case w^as going on simultaneously in many
other cases in the city departments. The Finance
Commission reports record many such instances. As
early as July 27, 1935, in a report signed by E. Mark
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Sullivan, Alexander Wheeler, Jacob J. Kaplan, W.
Arthur Reilly and Philip A. Chapman, the Finance
Commission brought particular instances of favoritism,
with consequent loss to the taxpayers, to the attention
of the Mayor and pointed out that the practice was
becoming general in the City departments. In April,
1936, in another report, the Finance Commission pub-
lished figures showing how much business particular
contractors had received under that practice. In almost
every case of such favoritism, the contractor selected
was one to whom the administration was obhgated for
political assistance.
As shown in many reports, a small group obtained the
major part of the work under methods of ordering that
were questionable. Payments therefor were also fre-
quently questionable.
It is a well established fact that when those employees
whose duty it is to supervise work for the City see one
or two firms getting all the work, without having to
compete with other contractors for the award, they
know that these firms have such influence with the
administration that it would be unwise to press too
hard for quality in work performed or for prices fair
to the taxpayers. The result is that usually the City
pays a high price for an inferior job, or pays too much
for a good job.
The Finance Commission recognizes that there are
emergency cases where there must be deviation from a
strict policy of award to the lowest bidder in competitive
advertised bidding. The Commission merely protests
against the granting of all work, or the major part of it,
in the manner allowable only in emergency cases.
To frame a statute to control this situation to such
an extent that rank favoritism would be outlawed is
probably impossible. It depends on the honesty of the
intentions of the administration whether the spirit of
the charter in this relation is respected. The Commis-
sion desires to point out that it has not been respected,
and to express the hope that the new administration
15
will direct department heads to respect the spirit as
well as the letter of the charter,— in other words, to
abohsh all special lists of contractors or firms, except
the list of those who have been discovered to be bent
on looting of the city treasury.
(h) Tax Abatements.
The Finance Commission agrees with the opinion
expressed by many informed agencies that property in
Boston is generally over-valued. This applies particu-
larly to much of the business property. However
careful the assessors may have been to set fair values
originally, it is a well known fact that subsequently
the values thus determined were often ruthlessly dis-
regarded when it came time to declare the tax rate. Each
year when the requirements to be paid by taxation have
been figured out and portended a substantially higher
rate if levied against original valuations, the assessors
rushed out to discover spots where they could place the
extra load, and many valuations were increased for that
reason alone. Often it has happened that after this
unscientific determination of assessed value had served
the purpose of keeping the rate down, attorneys were
able to obtain abatements without serious opposition.
In the granting of abatements it is also well known
that a small group of attorneys and political office
holders have obtained the major part of the abatements
granted. In many of these cases the new values
allowed have been questioned from within and without
the Assessing Department. It has become the custom
for some lawyers and some politicians to establish a
friendly connection with the administration or with
the Assessing Department. Such a connection when
made is frequently advertised among property owners
who desire abatements.
As an illustration of the usual results, the Finance
Commission offers a typical case. An attorney con-
nected with a large law firm was recently retained by
the City to prosecute a single case. He was led to
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believe that under the provisions of the charter act
he was required to notify the Finance Commission each
time his office settled a tax abatement case. In the six
or seven months he was acting for the city, approximately
35 notices came to the Finance Commission from him
that he or his office had just settled an abatement case.
There are a few other lawyers who have had many
more cases. There have also been cases where the
lawyer retained by the property owner did not have
sufficient influence to obtain an abatement and was
forced to bring a politician to his aid, whereupon the
abatement w^as granted.
Complaint of the work of the assessors is general.
Business property owners claim that they are improperly
treated. Some can obtain abatements, other cannot.
Residential property owners complain justly that be-
cause their holdings are individually small, considera-
tion is often denied them.
All who have studied the situation are agreed that
valuations in Boston are in a mess, and that it will
require a major effort to reorganize the Assessing
Department, personnel and work, so as to brin^ order
out of the chaos that exists.
For the past four years, the total of the abatements
granted have exceeded the amount of the overlay in
the levy. The overlay is intended by law to cover
abatements. A higher overlay would have meant a
higher tax rate. Though the law and sound financial
practice require the inclusion of the overlay deficit in
the next year's tax levy, for four years the City has
neglected this requirement. As a result there is now a
total overlay deficit of approximately $2,000,000 facing
the new mayor.
(c) Charter Changes.
(1) Election of Mayor.
The Finance Commission reported to a committee
of the Legislature in 1937 in favor of a charter change
proposed whereby a ]\Iayor may be a candidate to sue-
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ceed himself, that is, may enter the contest for the
mayoralty that takes place in the fourth year of his
administration. Because such a change is again pro-
posed this year in a new bill, the Commission desires
to affirm to the Legislature itself the recommendation
made to the Committee on Cities last year.
The Commission believes any change now made
should include the restoration of the recall provision
as it was originally written into the charter amend-
ments of 1909. That act provided for a vote by the
people on the question of recall at the end of the second
year of the four-year term.
(2) Effect of Abolition of Tax Limit.
The Commission desires also to point out that none
of the advantages have materialized that were promised
by the proponents of the bill presented in 1936 for the
abolition of the tax limit in Boston. The act when
adopted removed the legislative check on the City's
taxation right, or spending right.
This has not yet resulted in better or speedier budget
making, which was the principal reason given for the
change. In fact, the Commission and all the civic
agencies interested in municipal affairs complained more
than ever before of the inadequacy and incompetence
of the budget making of 1937, the first year without
a legislative tax limit in Boston. Removal of the limit
now permits a Mayor, at the time of submission of the
so-called maintenance budget, to conceal from the public
and the City Council the major part of his financial
planning, if indeed he makes a comprehensive plan at all.
No comprehensive plan was ever formulated in 1937.
Where formerly both the Legislature and the City
Council had opportunity to question a Mayor about
City finances before his spending right was determined,
now the Legislature is out of the picture entirely and
the City Council comes into it only in such fashion
that a real comprehensive study is impossible before
the principal appropriations are made.
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The Finance Commission has tried to impress on
those interested that a real budget covers much more
than simply the amount the departments will spend
for maintenance. The whole financial program for the
year should be included in this budget.
Budget making has actually gone backward instead
of forward in the time the change has been in operation.
(3) Abolition of Unpaid Administrative Boards.
On several occasions in the past, the Finance Com-
mission has recommended the substitution of single-
headed business management of specific departments
for management by unpaid boards of trustees. Because
four of the membership of five of the Finance Com-
mission always serve without pay, the members of the
Commission have had first-hand experience with and
knowledge of the difficulty of giving time out of the
ordinary hours of" professional employment to public
management.
The Public Welfare Department today spends around
§12,000,000 and the detail connected with the work of
spending is greater perhaps than that of any other
branch of the public service. The department trans-
acts its business with 25,000 families or more. Its
work deals with the care of over 100,000 persons.
Surely a business so vast and involving so many can-
not best be carried on by persons who can give only
part time because they must earn their livings in other
occupations. In 1930 the Finance Commission first
advocated a single paid commissioner of public welfare
to replace the board of twelve unpaid overseers. The
present Finance Commission unanimously still favors
the change in the interest of efficiency. Efficiency in this
department will distinctly mean economy.
The City Hospital.— The Finance Commission has
complained many times of the inefficiency of the
management of the City Hospital department under its
current type of organization, namely, a board of un-
paid trustees, and a medical superintendent. Specific
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items of inefficiency, waste, extravagance and other
types of mal-administration in great numbers have been
reported upon.
The Finance Commission has found that in the
present type of hospital management, responsibiUty is
divided and business administration is lacking. The
Commission in 1934 recommended the creation of the
position of business manager.
The Hospital Department now consists of two large
institutions which cost Boston last year well over
$4,000,000. The work of administration requires close
and continuous observation by the responsible head.
The board of trustees is now by law the responsible
head of the department, but unpaid. The membership
of the board consists of men busily engaged in other
lines of endeavor, every one of whom has made a real
sacrifice in giving time to the duties of trustee.
The present Finance Commission concurs with the
recommendation of the earlier Commission, which
advocated the placement of the management of this
department in the hands of one man paid a salary
commensurate with the responsibility of the position.
(d) The City Planning Board.
The Finance Commission believes the City should
have a planning department. It recognizes that many
who have served as members on the existing planning
board had much to offer the City and were willing to
give freely of their time even though unpaid. Unfor-
tunately, no regular, constant use has been made of
the department, though there have been distinctly
valuable achievements by it from time to time.
At times the Board has been relied upon by City
administrators for its planning wisdom and engineering
skill. At other times, and for greater periods of time,
the Board has been practically ignored by the mayor
in office.
Already in a report to the city government, the
Finance Commission has pointed out many ways in
20
which a planning department can be of real service to
the City. As a minimum of its importance, with dis-
tinct saving to the City it can be to the present set-up
of departments all that the old Engineering Depart-
ment was to the City departments before 1910, the
engineering service for all departments.
The City has continuoush^ for a long period wasted
large sums of money by carelessness of planning, and
in some cases ])y deliberately poor planning of municipal
improvements by scattered engineers and architects.
There has been no central agency for engineering
check-up of plans and projects. ]\lany listed as engi-
neers on the City pay roll who draw plans and supervise
construction are not technically trained engineers at all.
Under the existing methods, it pays hired engineers
and architects to make mistakes in planning. Correct-
ing mistakes means new plans and new construction,
and engineers and architects receive commission on
these changes just as though no blame could be attached
to them for the mistakes.
Department heads often order work without com-
plete knowledge of the facilities to be obtained. Part
way through the construction, often after completion
of construction, it is found necessary, as a result, to
make over the plans or tear out the new construction.
A central capable engineering department through
which all construction plans should be required to pass
will save the taxpayers money. A capable central
engineering department will be of great assistance to a
mayor in solving departmental construction problems
and in planning for both capital investment and regular
upkeep.
The head of such a department should be expected
to give full time. The Finance Commission believes,
therefore, that the unpaid planning board should be
replaced at the head of the department by a capable
engineer paid a salary commensurate with the value of
the service he should be asked to provide for the City.
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This has been part of the recommendation of the
Finance Commission relating to the demand for con-
sohdation of departments.
{e) Compiroller of City Accounts.
For many years the Finance Commission has advo-
cated a change in the charter which would make the
Auditor independent of all spending agencies and make
him free to exercise his best judgment in the matter of
the approvals of city expenditure. It has seemed to
the Commission that providing for this independence
might be accompanied by consolidation of the finance
departments: i. e., the Auditing, Collecting and Treas-
ury Departments in toto and the major portion of the
Assessing Department.
Such a consolidation would save some money and
would promote efficiency. To include within this new
department the operation of such proposed activities as
purchasing of all city needs and the operation of the
Printing Department would defeat the purpose of an
Auditing Department.
The substantial advantage to be gained by change
from the present set-up would be obtainable only by
giving guarantee to the head of that department that
no political power can injure him if he performs his full
duty. As long as the Auditor is removable at will by
the Mayor, as is permissible under the present charter,
his work is subject to the good-will of not only the
Mayor, but of other department heads and politicians
who might have more influence with the Mayor than
the Auditor. It is a fact that there have been occasions
in the past when city auditors have hesitated to interfere
in matters properly within their purview because inter-
ference might mean loss of prestige in the Mayor's office,
and eventual loss of position.
The matter of how an independent auditor can be
obtained has been a subject of discussion in Boston as
elsewhere. New York solved the problem successfully
by providing for the election of the Comptroller. The
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Finance Commission has already gone on record as in
favor of the New York plan.
The Commission urges legislation to provide the
City with an independent auditor and is willing for the
time being to leave it to the City Government to decide
what departments should be merged with the Auditing
Department.
(/.) Pay Roll Changes at the End of Administration.
It has become the custom in City Hall, when an
administration was expiring, for the employees of the
Mayor's Office who are appointed from outside civil
service, to be crowded into civil service jobs in other
departments. When no vacancies existed, new places
have been made for them. It has also become custom-
ary for an outgoing administration to reward special
service to the administration by out-of-time and out
of-scale increases in pay, promotions, transfers, etc.
The service rewarded is not always service that bene-
fited the taxpayers.
To the continued indulgence of these customs may be
attributed to some extent the steady grow^th in number
and pay roll rate of City employees.
At the end of the Mansfield administration this
practice was indulged to a greater extent than ever
previously. It has been officially estimated that the
eleventh hour changes of 1937 added approximately
$200,000 to the annual rate of the City pay roll. It is
fair to state that pay roll changes invohdng many more
thousands were sought but funds for transfers to cover
them were not available.
Many of these additions were most aggravating. All
of them placed an unfair burden on the new Mayor.
Many of them created great dissension in City depart-
ments and among civil service registrants whose rights
were disregarded because political favorites were pushed
ahead of them.
By statute such changes are prohibited in every
municipality in the State except Boston. In Boston
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they were accomplished by the assumption by the
Mayor of greater authority than was intended under
a charter provision which permits financial transfers
'^in closing the accounts of the year." Positions and
salaries not established by joint action of the Mayor
and City Council in budget appropriations were created
by assumption of emergency power after November 15.
Appropriations made for other distinct purposes were
transferred to provide funds for previously unauthorized
changes.
The figures of the 1937 costs will contain little evidence
of this extra burden. Most of them were purposely
deferred until so late in the year that in 1937 they cost
little. If continued in 1938 for the full year, a sub-
stantial amount will be added to the previous pay roll
rate.
Since the adoption of the segregated budget, which
an earlier Finance Commission sponsored, the Finance
Commission has advocated the establishment of a
definite date in the year for pay roll changes and the
authorization of them in the annual budget. The Com-
mission, in its own affairs, has scrupulously observed
this policy. For many years the policy was pretty
generally followed in other departments. The eleventh
hour changes of 1937, however, were all in conflict with
sound financial policy and constituted a public scandal.
To put an end to this practice, the Commission urges
legislation for Boston similar to the legislation which
governs such matters in all the other municipalities of
the State.
LIST OF REPORTS ISSUED BY THE FINANCE
COMMISSION IN 1937.
Jan. 5, 1937. To the Mayor. Report upon evasions of the charter
requirements in regard to contract awards in the
PubUc Works Department.
Jan. 6, 1937. To the Mayor. Protest against the purchase by the
city of a new site for a municipal gymnasium.
Jan. 20, 1937. To the Mayor. Relative to the inadequacy of the fire
alarm system at the Boston City Hospital.
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Feb. 1, 1937. To the Mayor. Investigation of charges made by a
former municipal assessor in relation to specific
abatements of taxes.
Feb. 11, 1937. To the Committee on Cities. Recommending an
amendment to the present Boston Charter Act relating
to candidacies for mayor.
Feb. 15, 1937. To the City Council. Transmitting statistics in rela-
tion to the amount of funds available and spent from
loan accounts for the sewerage works in Boston.
March 9, 1937. To the City Council. Relative to the annual budget.
March 30, 1937. To the Mayor. Relative to the operation of the East
Boston Traffic Tunnel.
April 2, 1937. To the Mayor and City Council. Extravagance in cost
of restoration of the Dillaway House in Roxbury.
April 7, 1937. To the Mayor. Relative to award of a contract without
advertisement for steel furniture for the clerk of the
Superior Civil Court.
April 7, 1937. To the Mayor and City Council. In relation to suits
against municipalities of the Commonwealth for
collection of money due Boston for welfare aid.
May 8, 1937. To the Mayor. Relative to investigation of the ex-
penditures of the George Robert White Fund.
May 10, 1937. To the Police Commissioner. Relative to the investiga-
tion of the George Robert White Fund expenditures.
May 15, 1937. To the Mayor. Request that payment to the Codman
Hill Construction Company from the George Robert
White Fund be withheld indefinitely.
Sept. 15, 1937. To the City Council. Transmitting a copy of first
report by George R. Farnum, Esquire, summarizing
the evidence produced in the investigation of trans-
actions of the Codman Hill Construction Company
with the George Robert White Fund and other city
departments.
Sept. 22, 1937. To the City Council. Transmitting a copy of the
second report by George R. Farnum, Esquire, sum-
marizing the evidence produced in the investigation
of transactions of the Codman Hill Construction
Company with the George Robert White Fund and
other city departments.
Sept. 29, 1937. To the City Council. Transmitting a copy of the
third report by George R. Farnum, Esquire, sum-
marizing the evidence produced in the investigation
of transactions of the Codman HiU Construction
Company with the George Robert White Fund
and other city departments.
Oct. 6, 1937. To the City Council. Transmitting a copy of the
fourth and last report of George R. Farnum, Esquire,
summarizing the evidence produced in the investi-
gation of transactions of the Codman Hill Con-
struction Company with the George Robert White
Fund and other city departments.
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To the City Council. Report by a majority of the
Commission in respect to the investigation of the
transactions of the Codman Hill Construction Com-
pany with the George Robert White Fund and other
city departments.
To the City Council. Minority report by the Chair-
man in respect to the same matter.
To the Mayor. In opposition to the proposed acqui-
sition of the plant of the Dedham & Hyde Park Gas
and Electric Company in Hyde Park.
Respectfully submitted,
David Lasker, Chairman,
E. Mark Sullivan,
Robert Robinson,
James E. Maguire,
Joseph Scolponeti,
The Finance Commission,
Robert E. Cunniff,
Secretary.
The foregoing report has been approved by me except
wherein it is in disagreement with the findings made by
me and stated in a minority report relating to the investi-
gation of the transactions of the Codman Hill Con-
struction Company with the George Robert White
Fund. I have based my conclusions in respect to the
other matters contained in the report upon examination
of the reports and records of the Commission.
David Lasker, Chairman,
Nov. 5, 1937.
Nov. 5, 1937.
Dec. 2, 1937.
